This paper presents a test methodology for evaluating the safety of mobile manipulators (robot arms mounted on mobile bases). This methodology addresses the safety concerns relevant to modern, agile, manufacturing practices in which mobile manipulators will play a significant role. We consider 1) the unique capabilities and anticipated uses of mobile manipulators and 2) the potential exemptions and special cases in which their behavior may be unpredictable or otherwise contrary to the safety requirements. Finally, we define metrics for assessing compliance with functional safety requirements and anticipated performance.
Introduction
The need for agility in modern industrial processes is increasing. Traditional paradigms for robotic manipulators and controllers are slowly being replaced by systems that are more dexterous, faster, and sensor-driven. As the capabilities and applications of robotics increase, however, the capacity to ensure a safe working environment for humans struggles to keep pace. Even with updated safety standards and modern safeguarding technologies in place, robot-related injuries and deaths still occur (e.g., [1] ). There is a clear and present need for test methods to verify and validate the safety requirements of current and next generation robotics.
International and national standards efforts are attempting to clearly specify these requirements. However, these efforts are focused on existing robotic technologies such as machine tools (e.g., [2, 3] ), industrial robot arms (hereafter termed: manipulator) and systems [4] [5] [6] [7] , and automated guided vehicles (AGVs) [8] . Emerging, novel, and hybrid technologies, such as mobile manipulators, are largely unaddressed. Mobile manipulators are manipulators mounted on mobile bases. They combine the agility of manipulators with the mobility of AGVs. They already are being developed and deployed to streamline manufacturing, healthcare [9] , and logistical processes [10] . Such manipulators are quickly becoming an enabling technology for agile manufacturing.
We have previously discussed the application of the existing robot safety standards to mobile manipulators [11] . In that study, we highlighted situations in which these standards are insufficient for providing safe operational conditions. In this paper, we present a series of test methods and metrics to address one of those safety situations: the integration of mobile manipulators into humanoccupied industrial settings. These test methods are part of the ongoing efforts at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to enable and support the development of safe, collaborative AGV and industrial robot technologies.
Section 2 provides a brief overview of mobile manipulators and their relationship to the existing safety standards. Section 3 outlines the metrics necessary to verify the safe functionality of mobile manipulators. Section 4 details test methods and potential exceptions of use for identified gaps in the existing standards.
Safety Standards
Mobile manipulators are a common platform for applications that require a large degree of dexterity deployable in large, unstructured environments. Most such application domains reside in dangerous environments, where the deployed mobile manipulators are teleoperated by trained experts (e.g., bomb-disposal [12] and search-andrescue [13] robots). Applying the mobile manipulator paradigm to less hazardous environments (e.g., medicalcare [14] and residential service [15] ) is an active field of research and development, and focuses on providing the same mobile dexterity to the more mundane setting of hospitals and homes. As of the time this report was written, safety standards do not exist for bomb-disposal, search-and-rescue, or service robots. However, the International Organization of Standardization (ISO) Technical Committee 184, Subcommittee 2, Working Groups 7 and 8 are developing guidelines for personal care and service robotics, respectively.
Vendors of industrial mobile manipulators do not provide an off-the-shelf, fully integrated, fully autonomous, arm-on-mobile-base capability. Instead, mobile manipulator solutions take the form of teleoperated and semiautonomous platforms for targeted applications. These solutions, however, are expensive, tend toward the proven (but limited) sensing and control functions of classical AGV design, and are restricted to constrained tasks. The mobile base and the manipulator are frequently treated as separate components, with the base being used to cart and park the manipulator to task-relevant locations. Controlling the mobile manipulator in this manner is conceptually easier, and, generally speaking, safer because it is not clear when and which safety standards should be enforced.
AGV Standards
In the U.S., the joint American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/Industrial Truck Standards Development Foundation (ITSDF) standard B56.5-12 [8] defines the safety requirements for the design, operation, and maintenance of AGVs. In Europe, AGVs must comply with the safety requirements in Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC [16] . European vendors of AGVs must use a type C-standard, EN1525 [17] to show conformance to those requirements. Attempting to harmonize the numerous national safety standards internationally, the ISO draft international standard (DIS) 3691-4.2 was in development for many years. ISO/DIS 3691-4.2 was never finished, however, and was deleted because the state-of-the-art of AGV technology surpassed the information discussed in the draft standard.
The next generation of AGV safety standards are expected to include several new criteria for 1) measuring dynamic obstacles and obstacles appearing in the "exception" or stop zone, 2) three dimensional (3D) imaging from an AGV to detect overhanging obstacles, 3) manned vehicles with automated functions when operators cannot see pedestrians, 4) detection of humans (in line-of-sight or occluded) and located near AGVs using non-contact sensors [18] , and 5) manipulators onboard AGVs, also with human detection from non-contact sensors.
Industrial Robot Standards
The international guidelines for the safety of industrial robots are provided in the two parts of ISO 10218 [4, 5] . Part 1 outlines the requirements for the construction and control of robots. It includes provisions for elements such as electrical connectors, control modes, axis limiting, and actuation. Part 2 establishes the safety requirements for integrated robot systems. It includes safeguards, external axes, and the integration of multiple robots and machine tools. Together, both parts of ISO 10218 ensure safety throughout the robot workcell. ANSI and the Robotics Industries Association (RIA) adopted both parts of ISO 10218 in 2012 for the joint ANSI/RIA R15.06 [7] U.S. national standard on robot safety.
Robot safety is concerned with the safety of the humans working near robots. The classical method of ensuring operator safety has been to enforce a strict separation of man and machine by way of physical barriers (e.g., [19] ). The 2011 revision of ISO 10218 added language supporting limited human-robot collaboration per the guidelines of the ISO Proposed Draft Technical Specification (PDTS) 15066 [6] . ISO/PDTS 15066 provides two mechanisms for ensuring operators safety: 1) speed and separation monitoring (SSM), and 2) power and force limiting (PFL). SSM enforces a minimal separation distance between a human and a moving robot. The robot's speed is scaled down or stopped based on the measured speed of the human. This ensures that the robot will stop in a safe and controlled manner without making contact with the human. PFL, in contrast, assumes that the robot and human will make contact, and enforces the rule that any applied forces and pressures will not cause harm. These power and force limits were previously based on a literature review of injury criteria [20] . However, these values will eventually be replaced by the results of an ongoing pain threshold study at the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, Germany [21] .
Standards and Mobile Manipulators
As a necessary prerequisite, we evaluated the AGV and industrial robot safety standards to discern the areas where there is sufficient coverage and the areas where there is little to no provision for risk minimization.
That evaluation was based on a representative, but not exhaustive, list of risk scenarios involving mobile manipulators. 1 This list is shown in Table 1 , which also lists relevant standard(s) that provide language for maintaining a safe operating environment for humans. For each scenario, we considered the various combinations of movement and control of the robot and AGV. We made a distinction between single versus dual control because heterogeneous robot control and coordination is neither well defined nor formally supported by the existing standards. Table 1 shows considerable overlap between the industrial robot and AGV safety standards as they apply to mobile manipulators. Both standards, for instance, contain language to minimize the risks associated with the unexpected enabling of AGV and robot drive motors (scenario a) and for handling the presence of people/objects within the robot's work volume and AGV's path (scenario c, first sub-condition). Where a single controller drives the mobile manipulator system, the language in both the industrial robot and AGV standards provides adequate provisions for human safety (see scenarios k and l).
In many cases, the risks associated with the operational conditions are specific to either the manipulator or the AGV base. In such cases, additions to the respective standards may provide suitable coverage for the entire mobile manipulator. For example, language for handling the Table 1 . Example operational conditions from [11] that have limited or no coverage in either the AGV (A) or robot (R) safety standards using either a single-or dual-controller mobile manipulator configuration. Conditions marked with "A/R" are covered by both the AGV and robot standards, while cells marked with "--" are not covered by either. robot position uncertainty (scenario e), and the gravitational stability of the mobile manipulator (scenario h), is provided in the robot and AGV safety standards, respectively. This generally holds true for the dual-controller condition; but, in cases where there is inconsistent or otherwise conflicting handing of operational conditions, the language of the robot and AGV standards is insufficient for maintaining safety. In Section 4, we focus exclusively on providing test methods for scenarios n through u from Table 1 . These were selected because they each contain configuration options for which there is no coverage within existing safety standards.
Metrics for Mobile Manipulator Safety
Numerous metrics have been defined for evaluating the safety of robot systems. Traditionally, most metrics take the form of binary evaluations: does the machinery stop when specific events occur, or not? Typically, this results in the strict separation of man and machine. As efficiency and agility requirements increase in manufacturing, strict separation will not be possible. Activities such as automated assembly will require some level of co-location of humans and robots. These requirements provide quantifiable guidance for metrics such as minimum separation distances [7] and maximum safe operational speeds [8] .
Separation Metrics
Anticipating the need for physical interactions between humans and robots, the next generation of safety standards will have established limits on the transfer of forces and pressures from the robotic system to a human operator (e.g., [7] ). However, these limits are still experimental; and, their functional safety -though considered to be overly conservative -has not been validated [23] . Until validated, these limits will not be included in mobile manipulator testing methodologies. Instead, the test methods described in this paper assess the effectiveness of the safety standards, sensors, and functions for maintaining a safe separation distance.
A safe separation distance is defined to be a minimum acceptable separation between an active mobile manipulator's constituent components and any humans around it. While the mobile manipulator is moving, this minimum separation distance, which should be maintained at all times, is 850 mm (assuming normal direction of approach [3] ) or the AGV's minimum stopping distance, whichever is greater. This minimum separation distance may be reduced to 0.0 m while the mobile manipulator is in a safe paused or stopped state.
The separation distance is measured in 3D using a simple Euclidean distance based on the closest point of approach (see Fig. 1 ). During the evaluation of the test methods in Section 4, these distances may be verified for example, via calibrated tracking systems and downwardfacing camera systems. Note, however, that the true separation distance may be greater or smaller than the observ- Fig. 1 . The separation between the human and the mobile manipulator is measured at the closest point of approach, which may be on the AGV or on the robot arm.
ing system reports due to perspective or scaling. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 where the side view of the encounter situation suggests that the closest point on the mobile manipulator is the gripper on the manipulator, while the top view puts the closest point on the AGV's wheel. In reality, the closest point is on the side of the AGV.
Note, these metrics do not consider direction of travel. In some cases, the closest point of approach may be achieved even though the separation distance between the mobile manipulator and human is increasing. This can happen, for example, when the arm is rotating to a stored position as the human is walking away from the AGV base. Hence, our test methods do not consider the kinematics or capabilities of the mobile manipulators. Rather, these methods assume that the mobile manipulator can change direction instantaneously.
The test methods described in Section 4 are intended for the verification of mobile manipulator safe functionality, and are not intended to prescribe safety systems. Because these test methods require 3D tracking of the mobile manipulator and obstacles in the environment, the separation distances may be evaluated post facto. However, because the maintenance of these separation distances is not verified in real time, no human should be inside the testing area while these evaluations are occurring.
Functional Stopping Metrics
The mobile manipulator should come to a controlled stop when being paused. Controlled stops require that 1) the constituent components of a mobile manipulator maintain adherence to their trajectories, and 2) the AGV does not lose traction or cause held/carried objects to fall or be dropped. These actions should be predictable and repeatable.
The manipulator may be required to make an emergency stop. Such stops should take effect immediately, without guarantee for path maintenance. Sudden momentum changes may cause held/carried objects to fall. Held and carried objects should be controlled or secured such that dropped objects do not constitute a hazard.
While paused or stopped, the constituent components of the mobile manipulator shall remain stationary and all stored energy remains in a safe, controlled state. These conditions remain in effect until a restart command is issued either manually or automatically per safety protocols.
Human Detection and Artifacts
In our previous paper [11] , we discussed the need for improved biosimulant test pieces and human-specific detection test methods. Such artifacts and test methods are critical to the verification and validation of safe operations of industrial robots as the physical barriers that separate them from humans disappear. It is likely that the test methodology presented in this paper will adapt to incorporate them as these technologies and test methods evolve and mature.
Evaluative Test Methods
In this section, we provide test methods and performance evaluation requirements for scenarios n-u from Table 1 and label each with a test number from one through eight. For each scenario, we present configuration setup descriptions, procedural guidelines, and relevant measurements. When applicable, "special case" exceptions are also given. These exceptions demonstrate that the risk assessment process may include conditions that either contradict or bypass the expected safe behavior of a mobile manipulator. Such special cases are provided for illustration purposes only, and are not exhaustive. Integrators and users should perform an evaluative risk assessment of specific applications to verify safe use of mobile manipulators during such operations.
During each test, proper safety precautions should be taken. Humans are not allowed inside the test area while the tests are running, and appropriate personal protective equipment (e.g., safety glasses and appropriate protective footwear) should be worn at all times during the tests. Standardized test pieces (Fig. 2 , [4, 8] ) should be used when applicable, or other biosimulant artifacts (e.g., mannequins) used when possible. Appropriate emergency stop devices should be in place, and all personnel trained in their use.
All suggested test methods in this section are expected to be feasible for manufacturers, users, and systems integrators to employ. Standard test methods are developed to ensure repeatability of the test by anyone who uses or develops the systems, i.e., mobile manipulators. The test methods discussed in this section are designed to be conceptually simple to understand and simple to implement.
Test 1:
Competing/Incompatible Safety Protocols (n) When producing a mobile manipulator solution that follows established standards, an integrator must consult available national requirements for the constituent parts. However, in the U.S., the AGV and industrial robot safety standards are not completely compatible. When integrating a dual-controller solution, the two standards may be contradictory with regards to certain requirements. When one control protocol mandates a pause or stop, but the other control protocol requires a completely different response, the results may cause unpredictable and unsafe behaviors. Example behaviors could include:
1. The AGV continues to move when the manipulator is emergency stopped in an extended configuration. Without the AGV detecting the extended arm, the AGV may continue motion causing an additional hazard.
2. The manipulator may continue to move when the AGV is emergency stopped. The manipulator may then extend beyond the AGV and collide with obstacles or humans that caused the AGV to stop.
Single-controller systems may circumvent some of these behaviors, but the integrator must identify the conflicts and choose which functions to implement. The current standards do not provide such guidance.
Ideally the existing standards would be harmonized to remove or resolve conflicts and provide appropriate guidance. Until this happens, test methods should identify conflict states. Here, we provide one such test method to verify three separate conditions. First, in a dual-controller configuration, which controller (the AGV's, the manipulator's, or both the AGV and manipulator) has emergency control to stop, pause, or command motion of the movable components of a mobile manipulator? Second, in a single-controller configuration, are the commanded responses compatible with the chosen standard's safety requirements? Third, in either a single-or dual-controller configuration, are the responses to potential hazards safe?
Test Methodology
To evaluate the functional response to competing or incompatible safety standards protocols, the proposed test method involves the mobile manipulator configured as illustrated in Fig. 3 . The basic test method consists of the following steps.
1. Align the AGV to move forward along a straight path, with the arm extended statically to the right or left beyond the AGV's width.
2. Position an obstacle (block, mannequin, or standardized test piece) to the side of the AGV, outside of the AGV's path, but within the path of the extended arm.
3. Move the AGV forward along the straight path at its normal application operational speed.
4. The AGV should stop prior to the arm making contact with the obstacle. (Optional supporting safety maneuver: static arm retracts prior to contact with the obstacle.)
5. Repeat Steps 1-4 for the arm moving back-and-forth normal to the travel direction of the AGV. Both the AGV and the manipulator should stop prior to the arm making contact with the obstacle.
Depending on the safety standard being referenced and the controller configuration, the responses to the above testing scenario are expected to be different. For example, the U.S. AGV standard allows, although not explicitly, static and moving components to be automatically moved after a safety stop and after the hazard has been removed. In the mobile manipulator case, this situation might, for example, include changing the forward motion profile of the AGV by moving the robot to its stowed configuration to remove the collision hazard. In contrast, the U.S. industrial arm safety standards require the robot to stop completely -either an emergency or a safety rated, monitored stop [7] -prior to collision. However, there is no guidance as to how the stop is propagated or validated. For instance, the moving manipulator may come to a complete stop while the AGV is still moving. Or, the moving AGV may come to a complete stop while the manipulator is still moving.
Special Risk Assessment Case Example
The above test methodology may illustrate behaviors that are incompatible with the intended application of a mobile manipulator. Although the reaction to a perceived hazard may be considered safe, the actual result could potentially be undesirable. For instance, say that the obstacle is a part or fixture to be accessed by the manipulator while the mobile manipulator is in motion. Upon approach, the part could be classified within the generic test method as being an obstacle. The safe response would halt the mobile manipulator or store the arm, even though the application intends for the arm to access the part.
Test 2: Human Carrying Large Load into
AGV/Manipulator Path (o) Any given robot safety system's protective sensing capabilities are limited by the underlying sensing technologies employed. Industrial robot safety standards require that safety sensors monitor workcell entrances and operational zones within the workcell. However, the very nature of the mobile manipulator renders the workcell concept moot. Moreover, AGV safety standards require 3D monitoring of regions surrounding the vehicle, but provide minimal specific sensor resolution (i.e., must sense the standard test piece) and no accuracy requirements, or any guidance as to how to implement such sensing systems. There are, however, no 3D safety-rated technologies currently acceptable as the sole means of providing protection of a safeguarded space [9] . Consequently, since most such systems are 2D in nature, they are susceptible to limitations of approach angles and occlusions. As a result, although an AGV and an industrial robot are both expected to detect intrusions into their respective protected zones [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , several conditions exist in which safety may be compromised.
When large workpieces carried by human operators enter the protected regions of either manipulators or AGVs, these pieces may not be detected in time or at all. During collisions, impact forces may be transferred through the workpiece to the operator. Mobile manipulators pose an additional risk with their unrestricted work volumes, complicating attempts to monitor and prevent hazard conditions. Example behaviors could include:
1. The long material being carried could be smaller than or not conform in geometry to standard test pieces such that AGV or robot safety sensors do not detect the material.
2. The manipulator, being required to sense one geometric test piece, may not sense the AGV test pieces and vice versa for the AGV not being able to sense the manipulator test piece (see Fig. 2 ).
Because of these concerns, our method evaluates 1) the capabilities of a mobile manipulator to correctly identify large payload conditions regardless of the angle of approach, and 2) the capacity of the safety system to stop or pause the motions of the manipulator and AGV.
Test Methodology
Our evaluation methodology and test method involve the mobile manipulator configured as illustrated in Fig. 4 , and follows the steps below.
1. Align the AGV to move forward along a straight path, and statically position the manipulator such that it extends above and beyond the AGV's height.
2. Position obstacle of different size/shape from AGV and manipulator standard test pieces [4, 8] -above the AGV and below the manipulator extended height.
5. Repeat Steps 1-4 for an arm, moving cyclically back-and-forth, reaching above the moving AGV. Both the AGV and the manipulator should stop prior to the arm making contact with the obstacle.
Special Risk Assessment Case Example
Presence-sensing safety systems such as laser scanners and laser gates are indiscriminate evaluators of the area around a robotic system. As a result, a large component being held by the AGV or the manipulator may inadvertently and incorrectly trigger an emergency stop/pause event. Similarly, in a dual-controller configuration, the problem is that the manipulator and/or the AGV may accidentally elicit emergency stop/pause events in one another. One remedy to this problem is to have the controller ignore all sensor information related to the motions of held workpieces or onboard equipment. However, until such controller capabilities are validated and available to the public, integrators should take special care when placing and orienting sensors. Similarly, users should be cognizant of the mobile manipulator's potential to "selftrigger" (i.e., the separate components sensing one another, detect the other as a potential obstacle) when programming coordinated motions.
Test 3: Velocity of Any Point Greater Than
That of AGV/Robot (p) The safe stopping functions of both industrial manipulators and AGVs rely on accurate estimates of the current velocity. As the complexity and dexterity of robotic systems increase, however, the actual velocity of a robotic system is difficult to define, let alone compute. An AGV's velocity, for example, is determined by the instantaneous speed and direction in which the AGV is traveling. For manipulators, the situation is quite different. In the latest draft (as of September, 2013) of ISO TS 15066, the calculation for SSM (see Section 2.2) uses only the manipulator's speed but does not take into consideration travel direction. The term "robot speed" is not well defined. The most common interpretation calculates manipulator speed as the Cartesian motion of the tool flange. This interpretation is limited, particularly because different parts of the manipulator may actually move faster than the tool flange for certain motions.
In agile manufacturing applications, AGVs and manipulators will be integrated to form a mobile manipulator. It is likely that in particular applications, they will move simultaneously. Because of this, we expect that the actual velocity of any point on a mobile manipulator will be greater than any of the component speeds taken separately. Example behaviors could include:
1. The manipulator rotates its base 90 • or greater from the aft AGV end to the side while the AGV is moving forward. The manipulator end-of-arm tool velocity added to the AGV velocity would therefore be greater than only the AGV speed where the AGV or manipulator may not be able to detect obstacles and stop in time to prevent a collision with the obstacle.
2. While the manipulator is moving, the AGV suddenly moves in the same tangential direction to the end-ofarm tool where AGV reaction may not be able to stop the mobile manipulator in time to prevent a collision. It is therefore vital that these speeds be monitored in real time to maximize safety performance. Ideally, the Cartesian velocities of all actuated joints and attached components on a mobile manipulator would be known and shared at all times. None of this information is provided by stock controller configurations. As a minimum, however, the Cartesian velocities of rigid parts nearest to detected obstacles should be approximated as they move toward potential collision states.
The test method described below evaluates whether a mobile manipulator can successfully track and compensate for the combined speed of the manipulator and AGV. Specifically, the test method will evaluate whether the mobile manipulator responds appropriately, and can successfully remove the hazard before a collision occurs. Figure 5 illustrates the configuration of the mobile manipulator for this evaluation. The basic test method, below, consists of Steps 1-8. Steps 1-5 assess the safe stopping behavior of the mobile manipulator, while Steps 6-8 establish the functional adherence to established robotic system speed limits.
Test Methodology
1. Align the AGV to move forward along a straight path, with the arm set in position 1 as illustrated in Fig. 5 .
2. Position an obstacle (block, mannequin, or standardized test piece) to the side of the AGV, outside of the AGV's path, but directly within the path of the arm when it is in or moving towards position 2.
3. Move the AGV forward along the straight path at its highest application operational speed.
4. During the AGV movement, rotate the manipulator's base joint to cause manipulator to move between position 1 and position 2. The end-of-arm-tool flange will move faster through world coordinate space than the AGV.
5. Verify that the AGV and manipulator slow or stop before the arm can collide with the obstacle.
6. Place a tracking marker on the end-of-arm-tool flange on the manipulator.
7. During the combined AGV-arm motion, track the marker in world Cartesian space.
8. Calculate the velocity and acceleration profiles of the tracked marker, smoothing the data with a lowpass filter, if necessary. Verify that the AGV and/or manipulator slow so the combined end-of-arm-tool speed never exceeds the highest application operational speed allowed.
Special Risk Assessment Case Example
On some movements -for example, when the manipulator is moving from position 2 back to position 1 -the AGV is effectively moving in one direction while the manipulator is moving in another direction. Such a situation can occur when the manipulator moves to remove a potential hazard with an actual velocity (as measured by the tool flange velocity, with respect to the world) that is lower than the velocity limit. However, a second hazard appears in the new manipulator movement path, i.e., opposite to the arm direction of travel.
There is a related concern if the mobile manipulator is carrying or holding a large object. While the AGV is turning or the arm is moving, the motions may result in a large moment arm with the large object that far exceeds the velocity limitation. Because neither the industrial robot nor AGV safety standards require all points on the held objects to be tracked, it is possible that velocity limits may be violated through the normal course of operation.
In both cases, internal representations of AGV and manipulator trajectories do not adequately capture the potential for collision. As such, a self-centric perspective of collisions may not provide sufficient protection depending on the vectors of AGV and manipulator motion. Rather, mechanisms for modeling relative to a world coordinate frame are likely to be required.
Test 4: Unplanned Restart from Pause/Stop (q)
The AGV and industrial robot safety standards contain language for handling the unexpected restart from a stopped or paused state. In both cases, the robotic system is expected to perform an emergency stop immediately. In the single-controller configuration, this is handled inherently. However, there are no such requirements when integrating a dual-controller mobile manipulator configuration. When recovering from a pause or stop state, restarting the motion of a mobile manipulator may trigger an emergency response from either the manipulator or the mobile base. If one component starts moving while the other is stopped, the stationary component may interpret this motion as a failure to maintain the inactive state. The required response is to initiate an emergency stop. Different circumstances may require an emergency response whenever the manipulator or AGV base moves unexpectedly. Example behaviors could include:
1. After an unexpected manipulator restart and without, for example, the AGV receiving manipulator restart notification, the AGV could begin driving while the manipulator is extended and even moving which could cause a collision with objects local to the mobile manipulator.
2. The opposite example to 1. is that the manipulator could begin moving after an unexpected AGV restart. Without the manipulator receiving AGV restart notification, the vehicle could be moving again, while the manipulator is moving and cause a collision with objects local to the mobile manipulator. The test method described below is used to determine whether a mobile manipulator will respond appropriately to an unplanned restart condition. By testing situations that may result in either the AGV or manipulator attempting to move while the other remains in a stopped or paused state, we can determine whether the mobile manipulator, 1) responds appropriately to potentially conflicting safety states; and 2) responds correctly when either the arm or the AGV begin moving when the other is not expecting it to do so.
Test Methodology
There is a related concern if the mobile manipulator is carrying or holding a large object. While the AGV is turning or the arm is moving, the motions may result in a large moment arm with the large object that far exceeds the velocity limitation. Because neither the industrial robot nor AGV safety standards address the issue of monitoring velocities of connected components, it is possible said connected components may retain or regain activity without the monitoring systems knowledge.
To evaluate the functional response to an unplanned restart from a pause/stop event, we developed a test method based on the configuration shown in Fig. 6 . The current AGV safety standards allow for an automatic restart 2 s after a potential collision has been cleared. Many commercial AGVs have this functionality enabled, but it is not required. This test methodology utilizes this and follows the steps below.
1. Align the AGV to move forward along a straight path, with the arm extended to the right or left beyond the AGV's width.
2. Position an obstacle in the path of the AGV, but not in a location where it could collide with the manipulator. 3. Move the AGV forward along the straight path at its normal application operational speed. Simultaneously, move the manipulator back-and-forth normal to the travel direction of the AGV.
4. As the AGV approaches the obstacle, both it and the manipulator should pause or stop their motions.
5. Once both the AGV and the arm have stopped, place a second obstacle next to the AGV, just forward of the manipulator, ensuring that any motion of the arm or the AGV will cause the arm to collide with the obstacle.
6. Remove the first obstacle that is blocking the AGV's path. This will clear the first possible collisions state, but the second collision state still exists. (Take precautions when removing the obstacle from the test site, as the AGV may begin to move again after 2 s.)
7. Determine whether the AGV moves or does not move with the arm's collision hazard still in place. If either the arm or the AGV begin to move, determine whether the mobile manipulator immediately enters a pause or stopped state.
8. Repeat Steps 1-7, reversing the order of the introduction of obstacles to the mobile manipulator.
Special Risk Assessment Case Example
In some scenarios, the AGV or manipulator may continue moving while the other is in a paused or stopped state. Suppose the mobile manipulator is paused because of a potential collision state between the manipulator and some obstacle. This conflict may be resolved by commanding the AGV to move around the obstacle while the manipulator is stationary. In a dual-controller configuration, unless this command information is explicitly shared between the arm and the AGV, the AGV's motions may result in an emergency shutdown.
Test 5: Error Recovery Startup (r)
A robotic system enters an error state whenever some functional constraint has been violated. Such constraints may include program integrity, motor torque constraints (e.g., collision detection), joint velocity limits, and virtual axis limits. Some of these violations cause errors that will force the robotic system to stop working. The industrial robot safety requirements mandate that an established error recovery procedure be in place when this happens. This procedure enables the manipulator to safely restart from such errors. The AGV safety standards have no such requirement.
In a single-controller configuration, information about the status of either component is always available to the other component. So, one component will be automatically aware when the other component is returning from an error state. However, in a dual-controller configuration, this information is not automatically available; it must be communicated and shared explicitly. No sharing requirements or communication protocols exist for this functionality. Example behaviors could include:
1. A dual-controller mobile manipulator is in an error state. When coming back online, the manipulator sees that the AGV is in an error state, and immediately goes back into an error state, itself.
2. Similarly, when the AGV comes back online, it sees that the manipulator is in an error state, and then immediately reverts back to an error state. The effect is that error recovery is caught in a perpetual errorinducing loop.
If this happens, exception handling or manual intervention is required to restart the system components safely and in the correct order, if known. As a minimum, a mobile manipulator standard must specify error recovery requirements and procedures to determine precedence.
The purpose of this test is to 1) determine how an error state would be propagated from a manipulator to an AGV, and vice versa, and 2) how an operator would effectively recover from an error state involving an AGV and a manipulator in perpetual error propagation events.
Test Methodology
To evaluate the startup precedence when recovering from an error, the proposed test method involves the mobile manipulator configured as illustrated in Fig. 7 , and follows the steps below:
1. Place the AGV on blocks such that it will not move if the wheels turn. (This is a safety precaution and not part of the test method itself.)
2. Initiate a joint/torque/current error in the manipulator. (For example, such an error can be induced by the following. Position the inactive manipulator over an immovable object. Insert a pneumatic cylinder or inflatable jack between the end-of-arm-tool flange and the surface of the object. Add pressure to the cylinder or jack to cause a joint collision fault.)
3. Verify that the manipulator is in an error state, and verify that the AGV is also in an error state as a result of the manipulator's error. 
Special Risk Assessment Case Example
In some cases, it may be possible to remove the fault state automatically provided enough information of the situation is known. For instance, a mobile manipulator that collides with and becomes wedged against a wall will enter a fault state that can be remedied by the omnidirectional AGV base moving away from the wall. Similarly, some error states of an AGV may be remedied simply by stowing the manipulator. Additionally, in circumstances where the motions of the AGV and the manipulator are commanded via a single controller, the circumstances in which the infinite-fault, state-propagation loop may be alleviated. However, a specific error recovery process must still be anticipated and described.
Test 6: AGV/Robot Software Safety Interlock (s)
Both the AGV and industrial robot safety standards require onboard equipment to be interlocked with the controller to reduce the risk of injury. These interlocks prevent the accidental activation of components. The AGV safety standards mandate that all such interlocks be implemented in hardware. In contrast, industrial robot safety standards allow for both hardware-and software-based interlocks (e.g., dynamic axis limiting or safety rated monitored stops). Example behaviors could include:
1. While the manipulator is moving or stopped in a non-stowed position, communication between the AGV and manipulator could be interpreted as the AGV is allowed to move which causes a manipulator collision-potential with objects in the environment. 2. Similarly, while the AGV is stopped, the manipulator could be commanded to move and without interlock AGV/manipulator communication, the AGV could begin moving causing a manipulator collisionpotential with objects in the environment.
In instances where such software interlocks are required for safe operation, an AGV and a manipulator are expected to respond accordingly based on two-way signal communications. The test methodology below validates whether the AGV and manipulator respond accordingly to software-based interlocks. Specifically, the test method determines 1) how two-way software interlocking would be effectively achieved when there are no guidelines or standards for common communication interfaces; and 2) whether the AGV can signal a safety-rated monitored stop or slowdown of the manipulator, and vice versa.
Test Methodology
To evaluate the functional response to software interlocks, the proposed test method involves the mobile manipulator configured as illustrated in Fig. 8 , and follows the steps below.
2. Position an obstacle in front of the AGV's path such that, as the mobile manipulator approaches, the obstacle could be hit by the AGV, but will remain well outside the restricted zone of the manipulator.
3. Move the AGV forward along the straight path at its normal application operational speed. Simultaneously, move the manipulator back-and-forth normal to the travel direction of the AGV.
4. As the AGV nears the obstacle, it should slow and eventually pause. Simultaneous to this, the manipulator should also slow and pause/stop accordingly.
5. Remove the obstacle from the AGV path in the direction opposite of the manipulator.
6. The AGV and manipulator should resume operation only once the hazard has been cleared.
7. Repeat Steps 1-6 with the obstacle placed such that it will be in the manipulator's restricted zone (but will not actually collide with the manipulator), but not in the AGV's path of travel.
Special Risk Assessment Case Example
A number of applications exist for which a mobile manipulator would be ideal or even mandatory. For instance, let the obstacle in question be a workpiece that will be worked on by the manipulator while the AGV is moving. The manipulator is expected to maintain physical contact with the workpiece at all times. This is a violation of the test method because the AGV perceives the connected component to be in a collision state.
Similarly, strict adherence to the language of the existing standards may actively interfere with the performance of the mobile manipulator even under otherwise safe circumstances. For example, assume the stowed manipulator's safety system continuously monitors its environment for possible collisions. As the AGV base passes an obstacle, that obstacle may also pass within the arm's restricted space. If the manipulator is not moving and the AGV is aware of that state, the AGV may not perceive this obstacle as a potential hazard. However, current industrial robot standards allow the arm to signal a pause or stop command if the potential exists for the manipulator to begin moving and collide with the obstacle.
Test 7: AGV/Manipulator Configuration
Update and Verification (t) As with any robotic system, the position uncertainty of the base components of a mobile manipulator must be minimized to provide safe functionality. The real-time ability to update and verify joint and position information accurately is critical. Inconsistent or unexpected updates can result in unacceptable position uncertainty and reduce the effectiveness of safety systems. Protocols for collecting, validating, and disseminating positional measurements are not mandated in the existing performance requirements. This shortcoming is especially problematic for a dual-controller mobile manipulator. Example behaviors could include:
1. During an assembly operation, the manipulator expects to be positioned by the AGV at one location, although it is instead at a different location because of AGV position uncertainty. The manipulator may attempt to insert a peg in a hole at the expected location and instead causes an end-of-arm-tool collision with the assembly.
2. After the manipulator has inserted a peg-in-hole, the manipulator is not completely clear of the assembly as commanded and the AGV begins moving causing the manipulator to collide with nearby objects.
The test methodology below overcomes this shortcoming by quantifying the uncertainty in measuring and reporting positions of the AGV base and the manipulator's axes. 
Test Methodology
To evaluate the functional sharing of AGV and manipulator configuration information, the proposed test method involves the mobile manipulator configured as illustrated in Fig. 9 , and follows the steps below:
2. Position two obstacles in front of the mobile manipulator's path and off to the side in the same direction as the manipulator. These obstacles should be positioned inline with one another in the direction of the AGV's path of travel, and set at coordinate locations known to the mobile manipulator. The height of these obstacles should be low enough such that the manipulator will not collide with them as the mobile manipulator passes by.
4. As the mobile manipulator approaches the closer obstacle move the manipulator such that its end-ofarm-tool touches a specific target location on obstacle 1.
5. Measure the position error of the manipulator's endof-arm-tool location compared with the actual target location; compare with the manipulator's expected repeatability and the AGV's localization error. This error characterizes the AGV position update uncertainty.
6. Repeat Steps 1-5 with the further of the two obstacles moved from its original position, and placed in front of the target obstacle's position inline with the AGV's direction of travel (position 2b on Fig. 9 ).
7. Repeat Steps 1-5 with the original configuration of obstacles, but increase the height of obstacle 1 (or lower the manipulator) such that the manipulator is now on a collision path with the manipulator. While the AGV is moving, move the manipulator back-andforth normal to the travel direction of the AGV.
8. The AGV should stop prior to the collision between the manipulator's tool flange and the obstacle.
Special Risk Assessment Case Example
The test methodology described in this section requires a mobile manipulator to approach and interact with an object. This is a reasonable expectation given the utility of mobile manipulators, but may necessitate a violation of the minimum separation requirement from Section 3. The current standards require the detection of humans, but do not prescribe biomimetic artifacts that accurately simulate humans. Until such artifacts are available, additional precautions -such as reducing the approach speeds or requiring audible warnings when approaching a potential collision -should be taken when evaluating the mobile manipulator's response.
Typically, industrial robots and AGVs carry cables, hoses, or other non-rigid components to execute their assigned tasks. This causes two problems. First, these components have unpredictable behaviors, and unexpected collisions may occur. Second, measuring and validating positional uncertainty is significantly more complicated. Measurement standards for such non-rigid parts do not exist, nor does any common language for describing the configurations of such components.
Moreover, manipulators do not generally provide position information about the components being held. Limited information may be provided for application-specific purposes (e.g., a transformed tool center point to a specific location on a held part for referencing coordinated joint motions), but the controller does not know the complete part geometry and configuration of these parts. External sensors are required for object grasp verification prior to workpiece-based operations (e.g., palletizing, kitting, or assembly) to minimize grasp slip.
Test 8: AGV/Manipulator Master Control
During Pause Events (u) AGVs and industrial manipulators have different requirements for handling errors and safeguard violations. The non-collaborative industrial robots require a manual restart from the disabled state following an error or a safeguard violation. With the adoption of ISO TS 15066, collaborative robotic systems will be able to respond to hazardous conditions by initiating a safety-rated controlled stop. The manipulator may then restart automatically when a halting condition has been cleared. The AGV safety standards already permit this automatic restart functionality. However, the question discussed in Section 4.5 still remains, "Which element, the arm or the mobile base, assumes master control for initiating a motion restart?" Example behaviors could include:
1. The mobile manipulator is stopped after an error has occurred with the manipulator controller. A master restart is initiated and the AGV begins moving while the manipulator begin start-up motions where normal encoder index pulse location for each joint is initiated. The simultaneous motion could cause a manipulator collision with nearby objects.
2. Again after a master restart, the manipulator and AGV continue, from before the error, with their commanded tasks. The AGV measures its location and continues on with the task. However, the manipulator expects to be at location prior to the error and without knowledge of its base being at a new location, the master reset allows both to simultaneously begin moving causing the manipulator to collide with nearby objects.
The preferred response is to have the mobile manipulator use contextual clues to accurately determine the correct course of action. However, this requires more machine intelligence than is currently in place. Therefore, an equally acceptable response may be to pause the mobile manipulator until all potential hazard states have been cleared. Contextual authority may be assigned following a risk assessment. The test methodology described below is designed to determine two things. First, do the AGV and the manipulator both have emergency control to stop or pause the mobile manipulator? Second, do the AGV and manipulator both have command authority to restart the mobile manipulator?
Test Methodology
To evaluate the assumption of master control during pause and emergency stop events, the proposed test method involves the mobile manipulator configured as illustrated in Fig. 10 , and follows the steps below.
1. Align the AGV to move forward along a straight path, with the arm extended to the right or left beyond the AGV's width. For this test, the arm is active, but stationary (or oscillating between two Cartesian points close to one another, e.g., < 5 mm distance). The manipulator can be moving or stationary, so long as it extends beyond the AGV width and it is active. Applicable manipulator safety standards should be in effect.
4. As the AGV nears the obstacle, it should slow and eventually pause prior to making contact with the obstacle.
5. Retract the obstacle in the same direction as the manipulator until the obstacle is clear of the AGV's stop field but still within manipulator's stop field. Alternatively, two obstacles can be used, one for the AGV and one for the manipulator.
6. The AGV should remain stationary, even though the hazard has been removed from its immediate path.
7. Retract obstacle further in same direction until the obstacle is clear of both the manipulator and the AGV.
8. Verify that the AGV's motion resumes.
Special Risk Assessment Case Example
The above test methodology is designed with the expectation that a mobile manipulator will avoid making contact with an obstacle. There are circumstances for which such behavior may actually be undesirable. For instance, if the obstacle is a part that must be accessed by the manipulator while either the manipulator or AGV is in motion, this functionality will actually impede on the assigned task. Upon approach, the part could be treated by the generic test method as being an obstacle, and the safety standards may require the mobile manipulator to stop with the part well outside of the manipulator's reach. Because the AGV is intended to allow arm access to the part, the application itself violates this generic test method.
Similarly, some applications may not require the coordinated control of the manipulator and the AGV. For such applications, the manipulator and AGV motions may be asynchronous and unrelated. For example, if the manipulator is moving into a stowed, standby position while the AGV is moving to a new workstation, the motions of the manipulator may be insignificant and contained within the profile of the AGV. However, the manipulator safety standards mandate an omnidirectional protected space. An obstacle (e.g., a post) being safely passed by the AGV may actually trigger a pause or stop state because it passes within the manipulator's protected space. In this case, the arm could still safely continue its stowing motion. The inverse case, when an obstacle is in the protected space of the AGV but not in the arm's protected space, may also prevent such potentially safe motions.
Mobile Manipulator Tests
The test methods presented in Section 4 are intended to characterize the safe performance of a mobile manipulator. However, because there are no existing standard mechanisms for the integration of manipulators and AGVs, many mobile manipulator solutions tend to be ad hoc. Until such standards are created, both the safety and the coordinated control of the system are dependent on the integrator. Here, we attempt to provide a more generic method to test mobile manipulator safety and to demonstrate the feasibility of such tests.
In the NIST testbed, as is expected to be the case in most mobile manipulators, the integration of a manipulator and an AGV (Fig. 11) consists of merging two robotic systems with independent controllers. Fig. 12 shows four sensors onboard the AGV that ensure the safety of each robot:
• AGV safety sensors: two dimensional (2D) laser detection and ranging (LADAR) sensors surrounding the AGV and 10 cm above the floor; integrated into the AGV controller,
• manipulator safety sensor: 2D LADAR sensor mounted at the base of the manipulator with a 190 • field-of-view; integrated into the robot controller,
• manipulator stow switch: push-button switch to inform the AGV that the manipulator has stowed; integrated into the AGV controller,
• AGV alignment switch: beam-break switch to inform the manipulator that the AGV has stopped and is aligned as expected; integrated into the manipulator controller.
The NIST testbed has no position or trajectory sharing integrated. The AGV's and the manipulator's controllers were left in their stock configuration, and therefore, respectively, adhered to the AGV and industrial robot safety standards. The AGV's safety sensor protected field signals triggered a low-level AGV slow or stop and the manipulator's safety sensor protected field signals triggered a gate safeguard event, forcing the arm to stop and remove power. Additionally, safety input and output (I/O) signals passing safety sensor information between robots and supporting software for each robot was developed and embedded into the controllers [24] . In [24] , we tested two coordinated control strategies: independent and master/slave. Independent control allows each robot to make decisions to account for their own safe control regardless of the other robot. Master/slave control allows one robot to lead decision making for both robots. For this paper, we tested fused, shared model coordinated control where independent decisions are: handled by each robot, simultaneously occur, and shared between robots. 1. The AGV was programmed to move forward along a straight path between two points, with the arm extended to the right beyond the AGV's width. The arm was active, but stationary.
2. An obstacle was positioned to be just to the right edge of the AGV and within the AGV safety sensor stop field of view. The obstacle was a standard vertical cylinder test piece that was well below the manipulator safety sensor field of view. A second obstacle, a cardboard cutout of a human, was placed beside the test piece, outside of the AGV sensor range, yet inside the manipulator sensor range.
3. The AGV was programmed to move along the path at 1 m/s.
4. Upon detection of the standard test piece, the AGV stopped prior to making contact with the obstacle.
5. The test piece was removed from the AGV safety sensor detection zone. The cardboard cutout remained within the manipulator's stop field.
6. As expected, the AGV remained stationary, even though the hazard was removed from its path.
7. The cardboard cutout obstacle was then moved until it was clear of both the manipulator and the AGV.
8. The AGV's motion resumed.
Shared control was needed to accomplish the task, although independent control was needed for the decisions made by each robot. For example, if the AGV controller detected an obstacle in its path, it caused the AGV to stop and also the manipulator to stop. The opposite, manipulator-to-AGV, information was similarly shared.
Test results demonstrated that shared, yet independent control of each robot is effective for this scenario. Fig. 11 shows a series of snapshots from a video recording of one of three duplicate tests. The figure shows the following results: Figure 11 (A) the AGV was heading towards a standard obstacle (black cylinder) to the AGV and obstacle to the manipulator (human form cut-out). Figure 11 (B) the AGV safety sensor detected the obstacle in the path and stopped. Simultaneously, the obstacle to the manipulator (human form cut-out) was detected by the manipulator safety sensor. Figure 11 (C) the obstacle was removed and the AGV began control to move as indicated by the yellow lights being illuminated. However, as shown in the picture, there is a red light illuminated on the manipulator safety sensor indicating that it detected an obstacle (human-form cutout), the sensor inputs the information to the manipulator and in turn, informs the AGV to not move until the obsta- cle is removed from the manipulator safety sensor field of view. Figure 11 (D) as shown in the inset picture, a green light is illuminated on the manipulator safety sensor indicating that it no longer detects an obstacle, the sensor inputs the information to the manipulator and in turn, informs the AGV that it can move. The AGV yellow lights indicate that the AGV is being controlled to move.
Timing and safety field range settings were, as in test results in [24] , viewed as possible instances where the AGV may be too slow to react to possible hazards. For example, when the AGV is commanded by the manipulator to stop, AGV deceleration combined with manipulator safety sensor obstacle detect may be too slow or the safety field set too short to ensure contact between the robot and obstacle is prevented. In our case, we optimized the test based on the current sensor setting placing the obstacles to not be contacted since our test considered only shared model control. Ideally, as in ANSI/ITSDF B56.5, the AGV is programmed with a controlled braking stop method to account for the variability in obstacle detection circumstances. Controlled braking allows AGV deceleration to be variable, dependent upon safety sensor obstacle detection, so that the AGV can preplan to slow and then stop before contacting the obstacle.
Test results as compared to metrics proved the following:
1. Separation Metric: Figure 14 shows a dimensioned drawing of one of the test setups and distances between the AGV and manipulator to a cardboard cutout of a human where several tests were performed. The nearest separation distance to the AGV is approximately 707 mm.
The distance is within the 850 mm metric described in [3] although the cutout was not struck by the manipulator since the AGV could stop within a shorter distance than 850 mm at the 1 m/s velocity. According to ANSI/ITSDF B56.5, so long as the obstacle is detected and not struck by the vehicle frame (or in this case, the fixed robot arm), the test passes. Several (approximately 10) iterations were completed where adjustments to the safety sensor detection range was increased and decreased and retested such that, for various vehicle speeds, any stopping distance within the maximum safety sensor detection range could be performed. Therefore, we conclude that the separation distance is highly dependent upon the vehicle, safety sensor, and test piece and passes the test, so long as the test pieces are not contacted by either the AGV or manipulator.
Functional Stopping Metric:
The mobile manipulator came to a controlled stop upon sensing the B56.5 test piece and the cardboard cutout in all tests. Moreover, when the test piece was removed and the cardboard cutout not moved, the AGV attempted to move showing flashing startup lights. However, no motion was detected since the manipulator safety sensor continued to detect the cutout. When the cutout was removed, the AGV resumed motion in the original forward direction.
Human Detection and Artifacts:
The cardboard cutout and ANSI/ITSDF B56.5 vertical test piece were used as artifacts to be detected by the AGV and manipulator safety sensors. In every test, these two artifacts were detected and the vehicle stopped prior to contacting them with the manipulator or AGV.
Discussion
In this paper, we presented test methodologies and metrics for evaluating the functional safety of mobile manipulators. We also provided potential use cases that may violate expected safe behaviors. Such cases require thorough risk assessments to determine if such contradictory behaviors should be permitted.
The test was intended to demonstrate feasibility of real, commercial-off-the-shelf robot systems to perform coordinated control. The test was also used to validate a proposed test method where the authors demonstrated feasibility of the proposed Unplanned Restart from Pause/Stop test method. Statistical data from more comprehensive tests could provide increased performance knowledge of these robot systems and uncover further robot coordination issues. However, a system (AGV and robot arm) was used for validation of the proposed generic test method. In order to validate the test method for all systems, other manufactured systems should also be used to validate this and all other proposed test methods to ensure expected safety performance.
These test methods will be revisited as sensing and safety capabilities improve, and as safety standards mature and adapt to the state-of-the-art in robotic system technologies. We also expect that standards and improvements in mobile manipulator control and performance will lead to safer and more reliable flexible automation for the future of smart manufacturing.
